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PREFACE
The Hughes Aircraft Company Pioneer Venus final report is based on
study task reports prepared during performance of the "System Design Study
of the Pioneer Spacecraft. " These task reports were forwarded to Ames
Research Center as they were completed during the nine months study phase.
The significant results from these task reports, along with study results
developed after task report publication dates, are reviewed in this final
report to provide complete study documentation. Wherever appropriate, the
task reports are cited by referencing a task number and Hughes report refer-
ence number. The task reports can be made available to the reader specific-
ally interested in the details omitted in the final report for the sake of brevity.
This Pioneer Venus Study final report describes the following baseline
c onfigurations:
* "Thor/Delta Spacecraft Baseline" is the baseline presented at
the midterm review on 26 February 1973.
* "Atlas/Centaur Spacecraft Baseline" is the baseline resulting
from studies conducted since the midterm, but prior to receipt
of the NASA execution phase RFP, and subsequent to decisions
to launch both the multiprobe and orbiter missions in 1978 and
use the Atlas/Centaur launch vehicle.
* "Atlas/Centaur Spacecraft Midterm Baseline" is the baseline
presented at the 26 February 1973 review and is only used in the
launch vehicle utilization trade study.
The use of the International System of Units (SI) followed by other
units in parentheses implies that the principal measurements or calculations
were made in units other than SI. The use of SI units alone implies that the
principal measurements or calculations were made in SI units. All conver-
sion factors were obtained or derived from NASA SP-7012 (1969).
The Hughes Aircraft Company final report consists of the following
documents:
Volume 1 - Executive Summary -provides a summary of the major
issues and decisions reached during the course of the study. A brief
description of the Pioneer Venus Atlas/Centaur baseline spacecraft
and probes is also presented.
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Volume 2 - Science - reviews science requirements, documents the
science peculiar trade studies and describes the Hughes approach
for science implementation.
Volume 3 - Systems Analysis - documents the mission, systems,
operations, ground systems, and reliability analysis conducted on
the Thor/Delta baseline design.
Volume 4 - Probe Bus and Orbiter Spacecraft Vehicle Studies -
presents the configuration, structure, thermal control and cabling
studies for the probe bus and orbiter. Thor/Delta and Atlas/Centaur
baseline descriptions are also presented.
Volume 5 - Probe Vehicle Studies - presents configuration,
aerodynamic and structure studies for the large and small probes
pressure vessel modules and deceleration modules. Pressure
vessel module thermal control and science integration are discussed.
Deceleration module heat shield, parachute and separation/despin
are presented. Thor/Delta and Atlas/Centaur baseline descriptions
are provided.
Volume 6 - Power Subsystem Studies
Volume 7 - Communication Subsystem Studies
Volume 8 - Command/Data Handling Subsystems Studies
Volume 9 - Altitude Control/Mechanisms Subsystem Studies
Volume 10 - Propulsion/Orbit Insertion Subsystem Studies
Volumes 6 through 10 - discuss the respective subsystems for the
probe bus, probes, and orbiter. Each volume presents the sub-
system requirements, trade and design studies, Thor/Delta baseline
descriptions, and Atlas/Centaur baseline descriptions.
Volume 11 - Launch Vehicle Utilization - provides the comparison
between the Pioneer Venus spacecraft system for the two launch
vehicles, Thor/Delta and Atlas/Centaur. Cost analysis data is
presented also.
Volume 12 - International Cooperation - documents Hughes suggested
alternatives to implement a cooperative effort with ESRO for the
orbiter mission. Recommendations were formulated prior to the
deletion of international cooperation.
Volume 13 - Preliminary Development Plans - provides the
development and program management plans.
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Volume 14 - Test Planning Trades -documents studies conducted to
determine the desirable testing approach for the Thor/Delta space-
craft system. Final Atlas/Centaur test plans are presented in
Volume 13.
Volume 15 - Hughes IRD Documentation - provides Hughes internal
documents generated on independent research and development money
which relates to some aspects of the Pioneer Venus program. These
documents are referenced within the final report and are provided for
ready access by the reader.
Data Book -presents the latest Atlas/Centaur Baseline design in an
informal tabular and sketch format. The informal approach is used
to provide the customer with the most current design with the final
report.
v
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1. SUMMARY
A spectrum of plans has been prepared to illustrate the range of
practical sharing possibilities available so as to assist Ames Research
Center (ARC) and European Space Research Organization (ESRO) in selec-
tion of a program meeting mutual goals. Five plans are described showing
increased participation by ESRO with ascending plan number. Each of these
has sharing properties fulfilling particular requirements such as available
ESRO budget level, extent of ESRO program responsibility, matching
particular ESRO capability, and cost saving to ARC through sharing. All
plans apply to orbiter sharing only.
A sharing plan based on the model Plan 4 may offer the most .attrac-
tive division of Pioneer Venus between ARC and ESRO. This plan allows
ESRO to bear primary responsibility for the orbiter and to avoid an exten-
sive financial burden. Savings to ARC are commensurate with ARC loss of
program control. Duplication of effort is avoided by using orbiter subsys-
tems that are common to the probe bus and orbiter.
A summary verbal report on this international cooperation task was
given to ARC during the midterm progress report, 26 February 1973. The
conclusions presented here are the same as presented at midterm. However,
some additional elaboration of the study work is presented in this report.
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2. INTRODUCTION
European participation in the Pioneer Venus program has been under
consideration. The purpose of the study task reported on here was to pre-
pare material to assist Ames Research Center in interface discussions and
planning.
The Systems Design Study has been largely directed to development
of a low cost baseline which can meet the mission requirements of the
program.
Familiarity with the overall system, subsystems, integration,
testing, and assembly requirements is used here to structure suggest
alternate approaches to a joint effort by Ames, with the aid of the Ames
prime contractor and by the ESRO. Effects of a possible interface on the
Ames prime contractor can then be discussed in terms of system require-
ments, costs, and schedule.
There is no attempt to identify precise roles of the ESRO community
organizations. The references to ESRO include by implications the Euro-
pean Space Technology Center (ESTEC) and vice-versa.
This study task examines some aspects of sharing the Pioneer Venus
program with the European scientific community through the sponsorship of
ESRO. In addition to technology sharing, cost sharing will occur because
ESRO will finance the work it undertakes.
In the contemplated sharing plan, it is presumed that the designs of
the probe bus spacecraft and the orbiter spacecraft will have many subsystems
and major components, which are nearly identical (as suggested by present
and earlier studies). These are referred to as "common" subsystems.
Primarily these common subsystems will comprise the "bus, " or basic
spacecraft, on which the science instruments are the payload.
In the contemplated sharing plan, the general design of both the probe
and the orbiter will be prepared by the NASA contractor in order to maximize
the commonness, hopefully, thereby reducing total project cost. The NASA
contractor will make the specific design for the probe and will manufacture
it and those common items required for the orbiter. The common items will
be provided to ESRO for use in the specific orbiter design for which ESRO may
take responsibility.
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3. AMES/ESRO RESOURCES
Alternate plans for the sharing of the construction and flying of the
hardware will be based on breaking down or segmenting the overall effort
into specific separate tasks. Before doing this, it is necessary to establish
the resources commanded by Ames and the Ames prime contractor (APC)
and ESRO and the ESRO prime contractor.
Two spacecraft, an orbiter and a probe bus comprise the major
elements of the Pioneer Venus system. It has been agreed by ESRO and
NASA that ESRO activity be confined to orbiter-unique matters. This
analysis, therefore, is restricted to the resources available to ESRO, in
both subsystems as well as a full scope orbiter program.
Resources are defined here to consist of funds, manpower, time,
and physical activities and are to be allocated to design, development, test,
assembly, integration, and management tasks.
The ESRO interest in a substantive program relates to its science
program policy. Presently, ESRO policy precludes sponsorship of an
independent ESRO planetary program. ESRO policy presently provides
about $27 million per year for science programs. This budget allows a
new project start once in about 2 to 3 years, depending on project costs.
It is more likely that ESRO would desire to commit this budget to a major
worthwhile sharing program or to a complete new-start program than that
it would desire to break the budget into parts to support secondary pieces
of programs.
ESRO contracts basic spacecraft hardware and functional tasks to
ESRO community industry. The classical ESRO approach is to solicit bids
from each of its three major bidding consortia (industrial groups repre-
sented by contractors in all leading ESRO supportive countries). Generally
this bidding process takes about 2 years or more for those programs
wherein the basic satellite design must be evolved. This process has to
satisfy political considerations, balance of payments, redistribution in
proportion to contribution (to ESRO financing), and has to bend to other
pressures engendered by the nature of the ESRO organization.
ESRO has sponsored some preliminary studies, through ESTEC, by
several leading European companies participating in space work. These
studies were conducted in 1972 and familiarized the ESRO community with
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the requirements of Pioneer Venus so that an ESRO procurement can proceed
with dispatch. Continued study effort by the ESRO community keeps its
industrial and scientific community abreast of and interested in the Pioneer
Venus program.
With respect to the assembly, integration, and test work package,
some comments may be in order on the size deficiencies in ESRO test
chambers:
1) With the spin axis oriented perpendicular to the sun axis, the
dimension of the Thor/Delta launched orbiter spacecraft in the
direction of the spin axis is presently 2. 77 m, which is greater
than the 2. 6 m illuminated diameter of the ESTEC test chamber
(HBF-3).
2) The axial dimension of the Atlas /Centaur launched orbiter is
3. 3 m, which is significantly greater than the test volume
diameter of ESTEC's HBF-3 (3 meters).
Unless this deficiency can be remedied without unacceptable conse-
quences, other test facilities of adequate dimensional capacity will be
required. AIT at ESTEC is a key element in any sharing program. The
incompatibility of spacecraft and ESTEC facilities, unless remediable, could
jeopardize the entire sharing program.
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4. SHARABLE WORK PACKAGES
To formulate alternate plans with different levels of ESRO
participation, it is necessary that separable work packages or tasks be
defined. These packages should have certain characteristics if they are
to qualify for assignment to ESRO. The scope of work packages must, of
course, be consistent with the degree of program responsibility assumed
by the assignee.
By way of illustration, certain subsystems with simple interfaces
may be assigned for design and construction according to performance and
interface specifications prepared by the organization responsible for the
spacecraft overall design. The assignee's product, so long as it conforms
to these specifications, will not significantly impact the remainder of the
spacecraft design. Therefore, the work can be assigned with assurance
and limited supervision to a subcontractor.
On the other hand, thermal control, for example, is a pervasive
aspect of spacecraft design, impacting the various subsystems as well as
the conception and configuration of the spacecraft itself. This task should
remain the responsibility of the prime contractor/designer because it
cannot be effectively assigned as an independent work package. Other work
packages in the nature of system design must also be a direct responsi-
bility of the prime contractor.
This situation is recognized in the sharing plans subsequently
described. Under some sharing plans involving assignment of system
design work packages to ESRO or its contracting community, ESRO takes
all system design tasks and full spacecraft design responsibility because
system design responsibility cannot be split between ARC and ESRO.
In those sharing plans where ARC retains spacecraft design respon-
sibility, the work packages assigned to the ESRO community have the
following characteristics:
* Clean and clearly described interfaces
* Manageable and economical coordination requirements
• Schedule compatibility
• Minimum of duplicated effort
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Work packages can be classified as hardware packages (subsystems
and major units) or function packages (sometimes called software). The
hardware packages listed are the noncommon subsystems of the orbiter;
the function packages are all orbiter unique.
1) Hardware
Despun antenna system
Orbit insertion propulsion subsystem
Command memory
Solar power subsystem
Data storage unit
Miscellaneous components
Science instruments
Orbiter unique structure
Modification kits for converting probe test vehicles to orbiter
configuration
Modification kits for common hardware
2) Functions
Mission analysis and design
Qualification and acceptance testing
Assembly and integration of qualification and flight spacecraft
Science instrument integration
Design of probe-to-orbiter modification kits for test vehicles
Vibration and thermal design verification tests
Direct purchase of common hardware from Hughes
Responsibility for orbiter design beyond baseline
The ESRO community should have prior experience with major
orbiter unique subsystems for which it accepts responsibility. ESRO
experience is available on despun antennas, orbit insertion motors, data
storage subsystems, and solar power panels. The Pioneer Venus despun
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antenna, command memory, and data storage unit have counterparts in the
Helios satellite, which might fulfill the orbiter requirements. The orbit
insertion propulsion might be accomplished by a version of the Symphonie
liquid propellant engine. These possibilities may be verified by more
detailed study. An illustration of spacecraft arrangement with these sub-
systems in place is shown in Figure 4-1.
The first five hardware packages are relatively independent sub-
systems for which performance, physical characteristics, and interface
requirements can be defined with relative unambiguity precision. Little
familiarity with contiguous systems of the spacecraft is required. These
subsystems can be subcontracted by the prime contractor with relative
ease. These remarks also can be applied to the first three of the functions
packages, since their content and scope can be defined and their general
inter-relations with the spacecraft are minimal.
The last four hardware items and the last four functions items are
of a different nature. To accomplish these work packages successfully, an
extensive overall knowledge of the mission, the spacecraft and its subsys-
tems, and the concepts underlying its design are necessary, as none of
these tasks could be successfully accomplished from the narrow subsystem
point of view. Whatever group takes responsibility for the last four hard-
ware packages must be prepared to take responsibility for the orbiter design
beyond the baseline.
Orbiter science packages may be convenient elements for ESRO to
provide, particularly those prepared in the ESRO community where inter-
face coordination can be local to ESRO.
SYMPHONIE LIQUID b
PROPELLANT ENGINE
C
HELIOS ANTENNA SYSTEM
\L
FIGURE 4-1. POSSIBLE ESRO ORBITER CONFIGURATION
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5. PROGRAM MANAGEMENT CONSIDERATIONS
ARC performs the vital role in the international cooperation program.
It serves as sponsor and organizer of the U. S. part of the cooperative pro-
gram, arranging with ESRO a program suitably structured for mutual benefit.
It will manage and fund the U. S. effort, directing the U. S. contractor in his
ESRO support efforts. Third, it provides a formal conduit for U. S. originated
information and hardware pertinent to the orbiter program.
The ARC described baseline for the Pioneer Venus international coop-
eration program is shown in Figure 5-1. It shows the semi-independent flow
paths of the probe and orbiter spacecraft. Important features of the plan
suggested by this flow diagram are:
1) ARC exerts heavy influence on the design of the orbiter space-
craft to assure maximum commonality in common subsystems.
This role requires extensive mission analysis by ARC, although
in the chart the orbiter mission analysis is shown as an ESRO
primary task.
2) Coordination is required among NASA (ARC) and ESRO (ESTEC)
and their leading contractors. (This coordination is not shown
on the flow chart, but is discussed elsewhere in this report.)
3) Extensive import/export activity will be required to comply with
the customs laws of various countries. The impact of this
activity may be increased cost of performance and a slower
schedule than is ordinarily associated with a U. S. domestic
program.
From the viewpoint of the prime contractor, it is important that
design integrity be assured. This requirement implies that either ARC or
the ARC prime contractor be the originator (via a baseline design) and keeper
of the design configuration, including keeping records up to date and assess-
ing the impact of ESRO work on orbiter design integrity. This task can be
effectively conducted by the contractor. The approach could be to prepare
a proper baseline design for each configuration (probe and orbiter) and (with
support of ARC) to maintain knowledgeability about its evolution. Also,
baseline interfaces could be prepared as well as interface specifications for
furnished packages (science) and for non-common hardware.
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FIGURE 5-1. PIONEER VENUS ORBITER SUMMARY FLOW DIAGRAM
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Again, from a contractor's point of view, responsibility trails must
be clear. Buyers and sellers should deal directly with each other to assure
satisfactory project performance; divided projects should have clear inter-
faces and responsibility trails. In the selection of alternative sharing plans
to be studied, any sharing approaches that do not have responsibility trails
defined by contractual mutual obligations between the contractors and the
sponsoring agencies, or between the contractors when the latter are mutually
obligated in the work distribution tree, have been eliminated.
The responsibility trail is established by the contracting procedure.
Presuming that ESTEC and ARC will arrive at a cooperation agreement
which adequately establishes their mutual responsibilities, the following
described contracting approaches illustrate two possible contracting schemes.
5. 1 APPROACH A
All obligations are to ARC. All deliveries are nominally made to
ARC. ARC asserts all requirements and specifications, supervises the
contract, and pays for all contract work. No obligations to other parties
relative to the project are undertaken by the contractor. Within this frame-
work, design, hardware manufacturing, testing, and technical assistance to
ESRO and ESRO contractors can be arranged according to ARC requirements
by definition in the work statement and its ancillary documents. This work is
done to ARC satisfaction.
5.2 APPROACH B
With respect to basic orbiter design and common hardware subsystems,
the contracting conditions would be the same as Approach A, all such work
being done to ARC satisfaction. However, by agreement among the parties,
the Ames prime contractor could sell, as a subcontractor to the ESRO prime
contractor, the common subsystems (with negotiated hardware modifications
where necessary) and technical assistance for support of this hardware. Such
work would be done to the satisfaction of the ESRO prime contractor, and
payment would be by the ESRO prime contractor. General technical assistance
for the orbiter program would be separately contracted with ARC for nominal
delivery to ARC and this assistance would be done to the satisfaction of ARC.
Technical support and assistance to ARC is desirable because it helps
preserve the technical integrity of the orbiter design needed to assure that the
orbiter will fulfill its intended mission. This support can be contracted under
either approach described above.
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5.3 EXPORT AND IMPORT FACTORS
Export and import factors impinge significantly on the cost of the
cooperation program. Export license may be required under the Munition
Control Act. For the Pioneer Venus program, this is formality only, but
should be done carefully to avoid subsequent burdensome complexities of
detail procedure. Import is the costly aspect of the cooperation, amounting
to about 5 percent of the value of imported spacecraft items (which valuation
must include the values of any assistance supplied, whether paid for by ESR(
or not). There are myriad details involved in duty "management" including
some which are cost reducing. An important question unsettled at this writi
is whether or not NASA/ARC can avail itself of duty-free imports. This
question could be investigated by ARC and a determination made to aid
project work statement preparation and cost estimation.
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6. MODEL SHARING PLANS
Suggested sharing plans should allow for different levels of
participation by ESRO, extent of responsibilities, technical participation,
and possible cost savings.
ESRO has not prepared a schedule for conducting the orbiter program.
Therefore schedule considerations must be based on a logical presumed
ESRO schedule. Examination of a schedule of program milestones,
Figure 6-1, is useful in arriving at any appropriate presumptive ESRO
schedule. It shows that design of the orbiter common elements is mostly
completed near the end of 1975 and components for the prototype are
delivered. Experiment hardware is delivered by the end of the third
quarter 1976. The launch opportunity for the orbiter occurs in the third
quarter of 1978. Another launch opportunity does not occur until the
third quarter of 1980, 2 years later.
This situation suggests that delay of orbiter launching until 1980
would result in a stretchout of the U.S. effort (which might be intolerable),
and in the launching of possible obsolete components of 1974 design vintage.
Undoubtedly the stretchout would add to U. S. cost, and would significantly
reduce the savings from sharing the program.
Different task.mixes for ESRO will require different degrees of
schedule discipline by the ESRO community. If an approach is used where
the ESRO community contributes only subsystems, then the schedule
established for the program must be maintained in order to prevent
stretchout of assembly, integration, and test (at substantially greater cost
of the program and perhaps other increased costs to ARC due to any
schedule slippage).
In an approach where a much greater proportion of the work is done
by the ESRO community, the financial impact on ARC of a schedule slippage
is less. The cost to ARC of a stretchout would depend somewhat on the
changes, if any, which might be required in the common subsystems due
to unforeseen program situations (since these items are under ARC pro-
curement in that plan).
An approach in which the ESRO community purchases the subsystems
directly from the Ames prime contractor offers the greatest schedule flex-
ibility for the ESRO community. It is possible through that approach to
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FIGURE 6-1. PIONEER VENUS INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION BASELINE SCHEDULE
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consider an orbiter schedule adjusted to a 1980 launch with the bulk of the
stretchout costs borne by ESRO; however, there would be some cost
increase to ARC. The obsolescence factor and the general hazards and
frustrations of a dragged out schedule wouldbe present.
Consideration could be given to a policy which requires ESRO to
agree to complete any program which it undertakes in time to meet the
1978 orbiter launch window, as scheduled in the proposed Pioneer Venus
program.
A schedule for ESRO, shown in Figure 5-1, is constructed to meet
this objective. It is attained by accelerating the initial elements of the
ESRO program, i. e., the study phases, contractor selection, and go-ahead.
These steps could be completed by the time drawings are completed at the
end of 1974.
Since ESRO is closely monitoring U. S. efforts, it has some prior
knowledge of the design directions on which to build its own program. About
mid 1973, a choice of U.S. contractor and of U.S. design c.ould be made to
provide specificity to the ESRO program. Early in the second quarter of 1974
a preliminary design review could further aid the ESRO contractor selection
process by pointing with greater certainty to the U. S. technical directions.
During the second half of 1973, and by the end of the fourth quarter of 1974,
when released drawings are available, the contractor selection process should
be completed and ESRO should be able to let contracts.
The schedule of Figure 5-1, prepared on the previously described basis,
shows that ESRO could have over 2 years of procurement phase time if it moves
with determination and decisiveness in the contractor selection phase. A key
element to successful use of the schedule is the ESRO resident study team.
This activity essentially provides ESRO with a running start on the orbiter
program.
This last plan is the most difficult plan from the schedule point of view.
This is so because ESRO groups must take a more fundamental responsibility
with respect to orbiter design. Also they must coordinate any modification of
common units through a long chain of organizations. Direct procurement of the
common subsystems by the ESRO prime contractor would help to expedite the
ESRO delivery schedule by reducing some of the time consuming formal steps
required for supplying them through NASA.
In the following paragraphs five sharing plans are described. All plans
apply to orbiter sharing only. These plans are illustrative, and are intended to
show nominal configurations of plans of five different scopes. Specific sharing
plans that might be adopted probably would be variants of those shown and would
require extensive detailed joint ESRO/ARC/contractor consideration beyond the
intent of this study.
Plan 2 conveys significant responsibility to ESRO beyond that of
Plan 1. Plan 3 conveys more than Plan 2, and so forth through the list.
Between Plan 3 and Plan 4 the control of orbiter design passes from ARC
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TABLE 6-1. SHARING PLAN 1 - SUMMARY
CONCEPT
Ames prime contractor designs all hardware in detail.
Ames prime contractor prepares construction kits which
selected ESRO community contractors will assemble, under
contract to the APC.
Ames prime contractor prepares specifications for some
support equipment that can be contracted to selected ESRO
community contractors for design and manufacture. The
Ames prime contractor provides technical assistance as
required for successful accomplishment of the contract.
Ames prime contractor assembles and integrates space-
craft, tests, supports launch.
Advantages Disadvantages
* High confidence in * Not attractive/substantative
product participation (to ESRO)
* Minimum program risk e Kit method increases program
in event of ESRO com- cost
munity failure
* Dollar contribution by ESRO
* No reliable parts prob- is reduced
lem for ESRO
* Prolongation of program dur-
* Extensive experience on ation due to procedure, and
Intelsat, etc., with this uncontrolled shipping and
method customs delays
* Customs costs are signi-
ficant
* Excessive manipulation of
hardware
* Extensive international sub-
contracting by Ames prime
contractor
* Presents contractual and res-
ponsibility chain problems
related to ESRO involvement
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to ESRO due to assignment of design responsibilities. This condition
necessitates that mission analysis and schedule responsibility also be
given to ESRO. This exchange in technical prerogatives between ARC
and ESRO should bring increased financial savings to ARC and increased
cost and involvement to ESRO.
A word of caution regarding the cost estimates is necessary.
First, the costs are approximate, but should be sufficiently accurate to
show the relative economic scopes of the plans. Second, the incremental
and support costs are estimated at a comfortable level, being neither
generous nor tight. Third, in estimating the basic costs, the. Delta
booster configuration current in February 1973 was used. Fourth, the
plans are representative only. Any exact plan negotiated would likely
have its own financial conditions which would depart some from the
plans described.
The format of cost comparisons in the plan is as follows. The
Rough Order of Magnitude (ROM) cost of the Delta booster version of the
orbiter was estimated in February 1973 and was reported to ARC in Hughes
document SCG 36036 V (Hughes Ref. No. 73(44)-00636/C6529). To obtain
the savings for each plan, the allocated work in the plan is identified and
priced. Then the added cost to ARC of conducting the sharing plan is
estimated. This added cost arises from the factors described in the pre-
vious paragraph outlining contractor Support and Technical Assistance
(S&TA) tasks. The difference between the transferred costs and the
S&TA costs is the saving due to sharing the program. This saving does
not reflect ARC or government in-house cost differences, which cannot be
evaluated here.
6.1 SHARING PLAN 1
This sharing plan, summarized in Table 6-1 and diagrammed in
Figure 6-2, is suggested by its successful use in the Intelsat IV program
and the extensive experience gained in its use. It does not meet the ESRO
requirement for substantive participation as defined by ESRO, and for
that reason is not a viable plan. It is presented here for the record because
of initial interest by ARC in its possible use due to its successful applica-
tion in Intelsat IV and ANIK programs.
The way this plan works is that the Ames prime contractor designs
all of the satellite and support equipment, in detail, and procuresiparts
and materials to specifications. These parts and materials are collected
into kits for various hardware and a set of instructions is prepared for
assembly of each kit. The kit is then exported to the appropriate non-U.S.
contractor for assembly and test according to these instructions. After
this step, the assembled unit is imported for assembly into the spacecraft.
Support is given to the assembly contractor in accordance with his need.
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The fact that all design is performed in-house and control is kept of
all parts, materials, and assembly methods, is very effective in main-
taining design integrity, and the responsibility trail is clear and clean.
However, this procedure reserves all the "noble work", a point of
considerable objection by foreign suppliers now that they feel capable of
independently designing satellites and satellite subsystems.
Generally this approach is more expensive than a non-sharing pro-
gram because the added cost of preparing kits and instructions, providing
support, and paying import duties, offsets any labor-cost saving at the
non-U.S. contractor. It also raises the risk of program slippage through
default of a contractor. This risk was reduced on Comsat Intelsat IV
because several spacecraft were ordered and the quantity on most items
trusted to foreign suppliers was divided among several. Hughes built the
prototype and first flight models and retained this capability during the
program as insurance against subcontractor failure. This protective pro-
cedure is too expensive for a single spacecraft program such as the
Pioneer Venus orbiter.
For effective structure of the responsibility trail, it may be neces-
sary to omit ESRO from the responsibility chain. This approach to shar-
ing of the ESRO orbiter work is judged not suitable for the program.
6. 2 SHARING PLAN 2
This plan, summarized in Table 6-2 and flow diagrammed in
Figure 6-3, offers a style of participation for the ESRO community in
which it can supply subsystems for the orbiter by a procedure somewhat
similar to that used for science instruments. It permits participation at
a low budget level.
It provides design integrity through the responsibility of the Ames
prime contractor for the overall orbiter design with specification of the
interfaces and the performance characteristics required of all ESRO
supplied items.
The responsibility trail is relatively direct and clean, except for
the fact that the ESRO subsystem supplier and the Ames prime contractor
designer have no contractual mutual obligations. This situation places the
burdens of design rectification, should a design conflict arise, on either
ESTEC or ARC, or both, a situation similar to that of the science packages.
Some degree of protection from default or from possible failure of the
ESRO supplier is provided by the fact that the Ames prime contractor (APC)
supplies technical monitoring of the ESRO contractor (on behalf of ARC and
by contract with ARC). In view of these obligations, and the fact that the
APC previously will have specified the performance characteristics, it is
to be expected that the APC would be able to help correct a deficiency or
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TABLE 6-2. SHARING PLAN 2 - SUMMARY
CONCEPT
Ames prime contractor designs systems and hardware func-
tionally, does detail design of, and builds and tests common
hardware and certain noncommon hardware.
Ames prime contractor provides detailed interface design and
interface specifications, and provides a design requirements
specification for selected noncommon hardware. These docu-
ments are provided to ESRO through ARC for use in procure-
ment actions.
ESRO selects hardware contractors from the ESRO community
and funds their work, accepting responsibility for effective
performance by the contractors. Contractors deliver to ESRO
hardware fully ready for assembly into the satellite. ESRO
exports the hardware to ARC which would provide it GFE to
Ames prime contractor. ESRO also supplies appropriate
support for its hardware.
Ames prime contractor provides, through contract with ARC,
technical monitoring of ESRO contractors to aid in achieving
interface compatibility and performance adequacy of ESRO
equipment.
Ames prime contractor assembles and integrates the ESRO
hardware into the orbiter spacecraft and performs the test
program.
Ames prime contractor delivers the spacecraft to ARC at the
launch site and assists in the launch with other participants
who may be required.
Advantages Disadvantages
* Provides some substantive * Some launch schedule risk if
work for ESRO, where its ESRO unable to hold sub-
contractors qualify system schedules, with con-
sequent effect on cost
* Provides a unified system
design * Technical risk on ESRO
hardware
* Has simplified lines of
responsibility * Has possible reliable
parts problem
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TABLE 6-2 (Continued)
Advantages Disadvantages
* Has some risk reduction * Provides relatively low cost
through Ames prime con- saving to ARC, part of which
tractor technical monitoring is offset by added ARC
support costs
* Contracting is simple
* AIT is simplified by con-
ducting it where the
majority of components
originate (at Ames prime
contractor)
* No funding exchanges
between ESRO and ARC
are required
This approach is similar to the approach used for handling science
instruments. It could be used if ESRO participation consisted of
supplying only certain subsystems.
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FIGURE 6-3. SHARING PLAN 2 ACTIVITY FLOWCHART
provide a backup article, albeit on a delayed schedule (possibly), and at
increased program cost (certainly).
An important aspect of this sharing plan is that ARC and ESTEC
would require a procedure for adjusting interface and performance speci-
fications to assure compatibility of subsystems with orbiter design goals
and to ease any conflicts between specifications and practical design prob-
lems. Adjustments of this kind would be made through the configuration
management and change control function of the ARC project office.
Table 6-3 summarizes the incremental cost and support cost attributable
to this plan and savings are summarized in Table 6-4.
In this sharing plan, the ESRO community subsystems would be
imported into the U. S. for installation into the spacecraft and testing.
Unless NASA/ARC are able to obtain forgiveness of the import duty, this
importation will add about five percent of these subsystem values plus
certain administrative costs .to the ARC cost of the orbiter program.
6. 3 SHARING PLAN 3
This sharing plan, summarized by Table 6-5 and flow diagrammed in
Figure 6-4, provides a plan of participation for ESRO of much greater scope
than Plan 2. It includes both hardware and functional work.
In addition to the tasks of designing, and building noncommon hard-
ware, it assigns to the ESRO community the functional work of assembly,
integration, and test for qualification and flight models. Some test and
support equipment is assigned also, as is certain mission analysis.
A key aspect of this support method is that the Ames prime contractor
contracts only with ARC and does not undertake any separate obligations to the
ESRO community. Therefore, the Ames prime contractor supplied hardware
is built to ARC specifications, schedule, and acceptance conditions. Any
changes, technical or program, are carried out under ARC directive,
according to the mutually agreed procedures. Technical assistance is
delivered to ARC in accordance with ARC directives.
This approach provides a very clean responsibility trail. Relative
to the shared work, it places considerable administrative burden on ARC,
some of which can be delegated effectively to the Ames prime contractor.
Areas in which the administrative burden is significantly increased include
information exchange with the ESRO community participants, design changes
to common hardware for benefit of the orbiter, support of orbiter design
aspects that affect the common hardware fielding in the ESRO community of
an ARC and contractor support team of significant size (at ARC expense),
handling trouble and failure reports from assembly, integration, and test,
which impinge on ARC-responsible activities, and other areas. Descrip-
tion of a project office structure for handling these activities has already
been given.
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TABLE 6-3. INCREMENTAL COST AND SUPPORT COST - PLAN 2
Host ESTEC/contractor engineers $ 187, 200
Six ESTEC engineers for 24 months during
1974 to 1976 (6 x 24 = 144 mm)
Average Ames prime contractor person fully
occupied with visitors:
Two for 24 months: 48 mm at $3000/mm $144, 000
Providing space and service to visitors:
144 mm at 300/mm $ 43, 200
Engineering software $ 121, 000
(added tasks due to shared program)
Orbiter-unique subsystems
Subsystem performance specifications $ 9, 000
Subsystems interface specifications $ 42, 000
Orbiter data
Baseline design data (existing) $ 10, 000
Data management (attributed to
sharing) $ 60, 000
Change engineering (as incurred)
Support $ 705, 000
Orbiter unique subsystems
At Ames prime contractor
Interfaces and changes $ 72, 000
Import duties and administration $200, 000
Special handling and testing $ 24, 000
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TABLE 6-3 (Continued)
At ESTEC
Interface and changes $384, 000
Travel $ 25, 000
Total of incremental cost and support cost $1, 013, 000
TABLE 6-4. SUMMARY OF SAVINGS - PLAN 2
Subsystems value transferred to ESRO responsibility
$ (Thousands)
Despun antenna 1, 035
Data handling 1i, 119
Orbit insertion 429
Power 1, 116
Total 3, 762
Additional support costs 1, 013
Net savings 2, 749
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TABLE 6-5. SHARING PLAN 3 - SUMMARY
CONCEPT
Ames prime contractor designs spacecraft and subsystems
functionally, does detail design of, and builds and tests common
hardware and certain noncommon hardware, performs
structural and thermal tests on Ames prime contractor-modified
probe structural and thermal models and makes baseline design
for orbiter qualification model.
Ames prime contractor designs the interface detail for the sel-
ected noncommon hardware and prepares the performance speci-
fication for the noncommon hardware. These documents are
given to ESRO by ARC for selecting ESRO suppliers. Ames
prime contractor coordinates science instrument interfaces.
ESRO funds and procures noncommon hardware and functional
work, including AIT, and takes the attendant management and
technical responsibility for it. ESRO modifies probe quali-
fication model to orbiter qualification model configuration.
Ames prime contractor supplies technical monitoring, via ARC
contract, of ESRO contractors to coordinate interface and
functional requirement matters related to ESRO work packages,
and to assist ARC in its monitoring tasks.
Ames prime contractor delivers their hardware to ARC, which
exports it to the ESRO assembly, integration, and test contractor.
The assembly, integration, and test contractor performs the
assembly, integration and test task with technical monitoring from
the Ames prime contractor, via ARC contract.
ARC imports the finished spacecraft and launches it with
support of Ames prime contractor and other participants as
required.
Advantages Disadvantages
Provides extensive ESRO * Requires high technical com-
participation petence from ESRO community
* Provides a cohesive base- * Requires large investment by
line design ESRO community
* Manageable contractual * No backup or workaround plan
arrangements if ESRO fails to deliver
6-14
TABLE 6-5 (Continued)
Advantages Disadvantages
* Provides some program risk * AIT may be difficult for ESRO
reduction through Ames prime community
contractor technical monitor-
ing * Has possible reliable parts
problem
* Substantial saving for U. S.
seems possible
This approach is applicable to the situation in which ESRO contributes
extensively, including performance of the AIT program. It retains a
strong influence of ARC through the ARC provision of hardware and
Ames prime contractor monitoring service.
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FIGURE 6-4. SHARING PLAN 3 ACTIVITY FLOW CHART
The cost of the Pioneer Venus program under this sharing plan will
be increased by any delays in the program caused by ESRO-community
problems; however, it is not so sensitive to delays as Plan 2, because the
balk of activity related to sharing is financed by ESRO and occurs at a time
of relatively low project activity for ARC and its prime contractor. The
incremental cost and support costs are estimated in Table 6-6. The cost
saving analysis projected for this plan is shown in Table 6-7.
6.4 SHARING PLAN 4
This plan, diagrammed in Figure 6-5 and summarized in Table 6-8,
is devised to place the main responsibility on ESTEC for carrying out the
orbiter program, based on the conceptual (baseline) design provided by
Ames prime contractor to ARC. Through this plan substantial savings
are realized by ARC.
The key to transfer of authority and responsibility is in the treatment
of thermal and structural model design and test, and in the treatment of the
prototype model for qualification test. Ames prime contractor will have
prepared, in conjunction with its probe spacecraft program, a baseline
design of the orbiter, which achieves orbiter mission requirements and
permits an effective design of common subsystems to be made. Structure
and thermal models of the probe bus will be prepared and tested and the
lessons learned will be reflected into the probe bus design. Then these models
will be sent via ARC to ESTEC.
ESTEC will design suitable modifications for the structure and
thermal models reflecting orbiter mission requirements, modify the models
and conduct tests, and reflect the lessons learned into orbiter design.
ESTEC will procure the orbiter unique hardware reflecting the Ames
prime contractor baseline design, but will procure from its own specifications
and procedures. Under this Plan 4, the requirements dictated by its own
mission analysis, structure and thermal activities, and its coordinate of
science missions will be reflected in the procurement.
With this control over basic orbiter spacecraft design, and by
specifying modifications of probe bus/orbiter common subsystems (by
arrangements through ARC), ESTEC is in control of and responsible for
the orbiter.
ESTEC will receive the probe prototype model and convert it to an
orbiter prototype, performing the qualification tests at ESTEC under its own
plan. ARC will provide probe-orbiter common subsystems purchased from
the Ames prime contractor.
Ames prime contractor technical support, in most areas, will be
substantially reduced under this plan, placing greater emphasis on ESTEC
selfreliance.
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TABLE 6-6. INCREMENTAL COST AND SUPPORT COST - PLAN 3
Host ESTEC/contractor engineers $ 360, 000
10 for 18 months, 5 for 12 months (240 mm)
Average manpower burden on Ames prime
contractor is four persons for
18 months, 2 for 12 months
Total 72 + 24 = 96 mm; 96 at $3000 $288, 000
Space & service for 240 mm at $300/mm $ 72, 000
Engineering Software (new tasks due to sharing) $ 405, 000
Orbiter unique subsystems
Subsystem performance specifications $ 12, 000
Subsystem interface specification (4) $ 60, 000
Orbiter preliminary test plan $ 18, 000
Orbiter data
Baseline design data (copies of existing) $ 10, 000
Probe/orbiter common subsystems
Installation data (new task) $100, 000
Performance data (new task) $ 25, 000
Data mgt (attributable to sharing) $180, 000
Change engineering (as incurred)
Test models and tooling $ 75, 000
Orbiter mockup (general arrangement) $ 75, 000
Booster/spacecraft matched interfact tooling (ESRO cost)
Booster/ spacecraft interface test simulator (ESRO cost)
Support
Orbiter unique subsystems $ 648, 000
At Ames prime contractor
(interface and changes $ 72, 000
At ESTEC (interface and changes) $576, 000
Travel $150, 000 $ 150, 000
Assembly, integration, and test $ 609, 000
Test program development $100, 000
Assembly and integration development $100, 000
Assembly and integration support
System engineering $ 45, 000
Product assurance engineering $ 45, 000
Special subsystem engineering $ 75, 000
Qualification and acceptance test $244, 000
Support of test preparation
System engineering
Product assurance engineering
Test engineering
Trouble and failure report assistance
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TABLE 6--6. (Continued)
Project office support at ARC $760, 000 $ 760., 000
Resident at ESTEC
Ames prime contractor manager
System engineer
Project assurance engineer
Test engineer
Total incremental cost and support cost $3, 007, 000
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TABLE 6-7. SUMMARY OF SAVINGS - PLAN 3
Subsystem value transferred to
ESRO responsibility
$ (thousands)
Despun antenna 1, 035
Data handling 1, 119
Orbit insertion 492
Power 1, 116
Support equipment 300
Total hardware transferred 4, 062
Functional tasks transferred to
ESRO
Assembly, integration 2, 000
System test 2, 800
Product effectiveness 2, 500
Total of functional tasks 7, 300
Total transferred to
ESRO 11, 362
Additional support costs 3, 007
Net Savings 8, 355
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TABLE 6-8. SHARING PLAN 4 - SUMMARY
CONCEPT
Ames prime contractor prepares baseline orbiter design to
include common subsystems, prepares preliminary orbiter
design requirements, preliminary orbiter-unique subsystem
specifications, preliminary interface specifications for science
instruments, delivers these documents to ARC, delivers the
probe structure test model, the probe thermal test model, and
the probe qualification model to ARC.
ARC exports the Ames prime contractor prepared items to
ESTEC. ARC also orders the probe-orbiter common sub-
systems from the Ames prime contractor and provides them
to ESTEC.
ESTEC engages contractors to make final orbiter design, to
reconfigure test models from probe to orbiter configuration
and perform tests, to build orbiter-unique hardware, to per-
form assembly, integration, and test of orbiter spacecraft
(including the converted qualification model). ESTEC con-
ducts mission analysis, science instrument coordination,
and other software functions. ESTEC takes full responsi-
bility for orbiter.
Ames prime contractor provides technical assistance to ESTEC
and its contractors according to contract with ARC and under
ARC auspices.
ESTEC accepts orbiter spacecraft and exports it to ARC for
launch from Cape Kennedy Range with support of ESTEC and
its contractors and the Ames prime contractor.
Advantages Dis advantages
* Large cost saving to U. S. * ARC relinquishes control of
orbiter design
* Appealing substantive work
for ESRO * ARC has no direct schedule
control
e Improved ARC protection
from cost of any ESRO
schedule delays
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Incremental costs and support costs are estimated in Table 6-9.
Projected savings are shown in Table 6-10.
Plan 4 could be adjusted to show an improved saving if less support
is given to ESRO. Elimination of certain support items and reduction of
others has been considered. One such study eliminates the support of the
ARC program office at ESTEC and makes other economies which further
improve the savings. Without a specific program to negotiate with ESRO
it is difficult to determine whether more or less support would be in ARC' s
best interest. However, the range of possible savings may lie between
these two plans.
6. 5 SHARING PLAN 5
This plan is actually a variant of Sharing Plan 4. Two basic dif-
ferences distinguish Plan 5 from Plan 4. First, Plan 5 is an effective
method for transferring additional responsibility and costs to ESRO/ESTEC.
In this plan, summarized in Table 6-11 and flow diagrammed in Figure 6-6,
the common subsystems are procured from the APC by the ESTEC prime
contractor instead of being given to ESTEC by ARC. Any necessary modi-
fications, technical support for the common subsystems, and delivery
schedule, are determined by negotiation between the Ames prime con-
tractor and the European prime in a company to company negotiated
contract. In this procedure is seen the second important distinction of
Plan 5: Ames prime contractor contracts to the ESTEC prime contractor,
establishing for the "common" subsystem a responsibility sub-trail
independent of NASA/ARC.
This plan transfers greater responsibility and design authority to
ESTEC by giving it a route independent of ARC for controlling the detailed
design and interface characteristics of the common subsystems.
This plan has an effective responsibility trail and can be economi-
caily advantageous to ARC through savings of the recurring costs of
common hardware and costs of support activities related to ESTEC use
of it. Compared to the cost of making its own independent design of these
subsystems, in order to independently control them, this method offers
ESTEC a significant cost saving. For all parties, this arrangement sim-
plifies the change and technical support procedure, which is reflected as
program cost savings, though its benefit is unevenly distributed.
This plan can also reduce substantially the additional ARC costs
that would be incurred in the event that ESTEC cannot meet the 1978
orbiter launch window, and thus forces a stretchout of the program to
1980.
A disadvantage of this approach from the ARC point of view is that
it reduces the ARC influence on the basic design of the orbiter.
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TABLE 6-9. INCREMENTAL COST AND SUPPORT COST - PLAN 4
Host ESTEC/contractor engineers $450, 700
14 ESTEC engineers for 18 months, 6 engineers
for 12 months (252 + 72 = 329 ESTEC mm)
Average extra burden on Ames prime contractor:
5 Ames prime contractor engineers for 18
months, 2 Ames prime contractor engineers
for 12 months
(90 + 24 = 114 Ames prime contractor mm)
114 mm at $3000/mm $352, 000
Space and service for 329 ESTEC mm at
$300/mm $ 98, 700
Engineering software (new tasks) $375, 000
Orbiter data
Baseline design data (existing) $ 10, 000
Orbiter-probe common subsystems
Installation data $100, 000
Performance data $ 25, 000
Data management (portion due
to sharing) $240, 000
Change engineering (as incurred)
Test models and tooling
Shipping thermal, structure and
qualification models $ 35, 000 $ 35, 000
Booster/satellite matched interface
tooline (ESRO furnish)
Booster/satellite compatibility
simulators (ESRO furnish)
Support
Orbiter-unique subsystems $290, 000
Interfaces and changes at Ames
prime contractor $ 40, 000
Interfaces and changes at ESTEC $250, 000
Travel $100, 000 $100, 000
Special test models support $140, 000
Structure model and test $ 50, 000
Thermal model and test $ 50, 000
Qualification model modification $ 40, 000
Assembly integration and test $463, 000
Test program development $ 50, 000
Assembly and integration development $ 50, 000
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TABLE 6-9 (Continued)
Assembly and integration support
Engineering $ 38, 000
Product assurance $ 38, 000
Special subsystem engineering $ 25, 000
Qualification and acceptance test $122, 000
Support of test preparation
System engineering
Product assurance engineering
Test engineering
Trouble and failure investigation
Sustaining support of common subsystem $180, 000 $ 180, 000
Project office support of ARC at ESTEC $ 904, 000
Resident at ESTEC $760, 000
Ames prime contractor manager
System engineer
Product assurance engineer
Test engineer
Nonresident $144, 000
Coordinator and support at
Ames prime contractor
Total incremental cost and support cost $2, 937, 700
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TABLE 6-10. SUMMARY OF SAVINGS - PLAN 4
Subsystem value transferred to
ESRO responsibility $ (thousands)
Subsystem engineering 1, 800
Despun antenna 1, 035
Data handling 1, 119
Orbit insertion 492
Power 1, 116
Support equipment 300
Structure 419
Cabline 317
Thermal control 160
Miscellaneous parts and components 600
Total hardware transferred 7, 358
Functional tasks transferred
Experiment integration 1, 310
Program management 400
System engineering 2, 000
Product effectiveness 2, 900
Assembly, integration 2, 000
System test and launch operations 3, 100
Total functional tasks transferred 11, 710
Grand total of tasks transferred 19, 068
Additional support costs 2,937
Net Savings 17, 131
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TABLE 6-11. SHARING PLAN 5 -SUMMARY
CONCEPT
Ames prime contractor prepares baseline orbiter design to
include common subsystems, preliminary orbiter design re-
quirements, preliminary orbiter-unique subsystem
specifications, and preliminary interface specifications for
science instruments. Ames prime contractor delivers these
documents, delivers the probe structure test model, the
probe thermal test model, and the probe qualification model
to ARC.
ARC exports the Ames prime contractor prepared items to ESTEC.
ESTEC engages contractors to make final orbiter design, to
reconfigure test models from probe to orbiter configuration
and perform tests, to build orbiter-unique hardware, to per-
form assembly, integration, and test of orbiter spacecraft
(including the converted qualification model).
The ESTEC prime contractor purchases common subsystems
from Ames prime contractor according to ARC specifications
previously used for the probe program. Any modifications
required for the orbiter are negotiated between Ames prime
contractor and the ESTEC prime. Ames prime contractor
provides technical assistance to the ESTEC prime for appli-
cation problems of the common subsystems under contract
to the ESTEC prime.
ESTEC conducts all mission analysis and performs all other
software and functional tasks. ESTEC takes full responsi-
bility for the orbiter. It accepts the ready spacecraft from
the prime contractor and exports it to ARC for launch at
Cape Kennedy Range, supporting the launch as required.
Ames prime contractor contracts separately with ARC to support
ARC with technical assistance at ESTEC as required by ARC.
Advantages Disadvantages
o Maximum cost saving to * ARC loses control of orbiter
ARC program
* Maximum protection for * Purchase of Ames prime con-
ARC against ESRO sched- tractor subsystems conflicts
ule delay with ESRO financial policies
e Minimized duplication of
ARC/ESRO effort through
use of common subsystems
* Attractive program to ESRO
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A disadvantage from the ESRO point of view is that a substantial
amount of its funds would be paid to the Ames prime contractor for the
common systems, modifications, if any, and common-system technical
support. This requirement may come into basic conflict with the financial
precepts of the ESRO organization.
Clarification regarding technical assistance provided by the Ames
prime contractor under this plan is in order. Two different segments of
technical assistance would be contracted. With ARC, the Ames prime
contractor would contract "program office" (i. e., overall) support. The
amount of this support would be reduced because of the transferrence of
common subsystem support to common subsystem contracts at ESTEC' s
cost. With the common subsystem contracts, Hughes would supply that
technical assistance which is necessary for understanding, proper per-
formance, and effective application of the common subsystems.
Incremental costs and support costs are shown in Table 6-12 and
projected cost savings are shown in Table 6-13.
TABLE 6-12. INCREMENTAL COST AND SUPPORT COST - PLAN 5
Host ESTEC/contractor engineers $ 450, 700
(same as Plan 4)
Engineering software $ 10, 000
Baseline design data (existing) $ 10, 000
Test models and tooling $ 45, 000
Shipping test models, structure
and qualification models $ 45, 000
Travel $ 50, 000 $ 50, 000
Project office support of ARC at ESTEC $ 644, 000
Resident $500, 000
Nonresident $144, 000
Total of incremental cost and
support cost, Plan 5 $1, 199, 700
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TABLE 6-13. SUMMARY OF SAVINGS - PLAN 5
Subsystem value transferred to
ESRO responsibility
$ (thousands)
Hardware orbiter unique (from Plan 4) 7, 358
Hardware common (purchased directly
from Ames prime contractor) 4, 142
Total hardware 11, 550
Functional tasks transferred to
ESRO responsibility (from Plan 4) 11, 710
Additional product effectiveness 500
Additional system engineering 500
Total functional tasks transferred 12, 710
Grand total of cost transferred to ESRO 25, 260
Additional support cost to ARC 1, 200
Net cost transferred (saving) 23, 060
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